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Abstract—Channel state information (CSI) has been recently
shown to be useful in performing security attacks in public WiFi
environments. By analyzing how CSI is affected by the finger
motions, CSI-based attacks can effectively reconstruct text-based
passwords and locking patterns. This paper presents WiGuard,
a novel system to protect sensitive on-screen gestures in a public
place. Our approach carefully exploits the WiFi channel interfer-
ence to introduce noise into the attacker’s CSI measurement to
reduce the success rate of the attack. Our approach automatically
detects when a CSI-based attack happens. We evaluate our
approach by applying it to protect text-based passwords and
pattern locks on mobile devices. Experimental results show that
our approach is able to reduces the success rate of CSI attacks
from 92% to 42% for text-based passwords and from 82% to
22% for pattern lock.
Keywords: CSI-based attack, privacy protection, channel interfer-
ence
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and tables are often used in public places
(e.g. coffee shops, hotels, shopping malls, airports etc.) and
connects to a public WiFi. Using mobile devices in such
environments, however, opens up a backdoor for attackers
who can steal the user’s passwords by analyzing how the
channel state information (CSI) of the WIFI signal is affected
by the user’s fingertip movement when entering a password.
This type of attacks is known as CSI-based attacks. It has
been demonstrated to be effective in reconstructing PIN-based
passwords [1] and text-based passwords [2] as well as locking
patterns [3].
The simple setup of a CSI-based attack makes it a real
threat for mobile users. Figure 1 depicts some typical scenarios
where a CSI-based attack can be successfully performed. In
all these scenarios, the attacker only needs to place a WiFi
receiver (e.g. a wireless router or a laptop) next to the victim,
with a distance ranges from 1 meter to 5 meters. Such a setting
is unlikely to raise suspicion to many users in public places.
The underlying principal of a CSI-based attack is to use
the CSI measurements to characterize the change of the mul-
tipath propagation of WFI signals caused by nearby gesture
movements. The CSI readings can be mapped a keystroke or a
pattern because each fingertip movement and location can be
mapped to a unique CSI value. In order to capture the subtle
differences between gestures, the CSI must be measured at a
fine-grained level. This is often done by sending high-frequent
ICMP packets to the target AP to obtain a high frequent
















Fig. 1: Attack Scenarios. The target is doing gesture privacy
in public place, and the attacker receives the gesture-related
CSI values using NICs in scenario 1 and scenario 4 while
in scenario 2 and scenario 3, the attacker using her laptop to
receive the gesture-related CSI values.
target AP. For instance, the work presented in [2] requires the
attacker to send at least 2500 ICMP packets per second to
the target AP. Therefore, obtaining high-frequent, fine-grained
CSI measurements is key to the success of CSI-based attacks.
This paper presents WiGuard, a system to protect sensitive
on-screen gestures against CSI-based attacks. Our key insight
is that a CSI-based attack is likely to fail if the messages
sent in response to the attacker’s ICMP packets are lousy.
While there are a number of methods available to drop ICMP
responses [4], the communication quality of the target device
cannot be ignored. Our approach to this issue is to exploit
the fact that the communication quality of the target AP will
decrease if there exists another AP uses a channel next to the
target AP’s working channel. To reduce the impact to the user,
our approach automatically detects when an attack is likely to
happen by monitoring the network activities, and only switches
on the protected scheme if an attack is detected.
As a departure from prior work that all consider the channel
interferences as a harmful effect and make every effort to
prevent it from happening [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], our approach
carefully utilizes the interference for information protection.
Our design overcomes a number of practical challenges. These
include: how to detect a CSI-based attack? how to introduce
noises to the attack without significantly affecting the network
performance? All these challenges require novel solutions to
be constructed in this new application context.
We have evaluated our approach by using it to protect
text-based passwords and locking patterns in public WiFI
environments. We show that WiGuard can successfully defeat
CSI-based attacks by reducing the accuracy of keystroke and
pattern recognition from 92% and 82% respectively to 42%
and 22%, with little impact to the communication quality.
Contributions: This paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• It proposes a novel approach for protecting sensitive
gestures against CSI-based attacks;
• It is the first work to exploit channel interference to
protect sensitive information to be leaked from mobile
devices;
• Experimental results show that the proposed approach can
effectively defeat CSI-based attacks.
II. CSI-BASED ATTACK
With more and more public places deploying public WiFi,
CSI has received much attention [10] [11], and because of rich
information that CSI contains, it can be used to detect micro
motions, such as finger motions [2] [3] and mouth motions
[12]. With a commercial receiver, the attacker can obtain the
users’ PIN, passwords or other gesture privacy information.
In this section, first we introduce why CSI can detect and
recover the gesture privacy, and then will introduce a novel
attack, CSI-based attack.
A. Overview of CSI
Channel state information(CSI) contains fine-grained infor-
mation of wireless signals and it is the characterization of
variations in the wireless channel and it can be obtained by
WiFi network interface controllers (NICs).
B. CSI-based Gesture Privacy Recovery Model
The reason why CSI values can be used to recover gesture
privacy is that while a user does gesture privacy, the motions
that come from the certain parts of the body will introduce rel-
ative muti-path propagation of wireless signals, and different
motions correspond to different multi-path propagation, thus a
certain motion will generate a unique pattern in the time-series
CSI values, and the uniqueness can be exploited to recover the
gesture privacy.
For CSI-based gesture privacy recovery model, there are
several steps for a successful recognition. First, noise need to
be removed from the obtained signals. After noise removal,
the actual influenced signal traces need to be extracted and
then the gesture recovery methods will be applied to recover
the gesture privacy, as shown in Figure 2.
C. CSI-based Attack
After receiving the wireless signals that are related to ges-
ture privacy, the attacker can decode the gestures successfully
using noise removal, feature chosen and gesture recognition
techniques. However, in order to achieve CSI-based attack,
there are several requirements that the attacker successfully
decode the gesture privacy and it can be equivalent with the
following equation:
CSI-based Attack ⇔ (Wireless Transmitter, Signal Receiv-
er, ICMP ping packets at a high rate from transmitter,
Communication Channel between Transmitter and Receiver,
QualityCSI )
The interpretation of above equations is as follows: there
must be a wireless transmitter and a signal receiver. The
wireless transmitter is used to emit wireless signals while the
signal receiver is used to receive the time-series CSI values.
In order to characterize the fine-grained gestures, especially
for those similar gestures, ICMP ping packets from the trans-
mitter must be at a high rate. Besides, the communication
channel between transmitter and receiver must be stable, if
the communication channel is interfered and is not stable,
the receiver will not receive the ICMP ping packets from the
transmitter, that will lead to incomplete time-series CSI values.
QualityCSI describes the quality of obtained time-series CSI
values that are received by the receiver, if the wireless signals
are interfered during the multi-path propagation process, , the
received time-series CSI values will be changed at the receiver
end, that will lead to the distortions of CSI waveforms.
III. THREAT MODEL
We consider a scenario where an attacker seeks to identify
the users’ gesture privacy in a sequence of time-series CSI
values generated by the users’ gestures, the attacker doesn’t
need to be near to the user or have any displayed information
on the users’ screen. We assume that the attacker can access
the public WiFi, ping the public WiFi AP at a high rate
and receive the time-series CSI values using a receiver. Two
representative scenarios the attack is plausible are: (1) the
attacker inconspicuously leaves a prepared receiver end (e.g.
network NICs) in the public place, perhaps in a hidden setting
where the receiver is not suspicious; (2) the attacker pretends
to work in a public place using his laptop and he looks
unsuspicious.
For scenario 1, the user is unlocking the device while the
attacker receives the CSI values using network NICs, the
attacker is far away from the user and he leaves the prepared
network NICs near to the user. However, the position of the
network NICs is hidden and the user will not notice the
receiver. For scenario 2, the attacker pretends to work on her
laptop, which is used to receive the CSI values. The attacker
looks unsuspicious and the user will not be aware of him/her.
IV. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE
The IEEE 802.11 is widely used for public WiFi and it
usually works on 2.4 GHz, which is between 2400 MHz and
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Fig. 2: The process of CSI-based attack. There are two kinds of gesture privacy presented in this figure, and one is consecutive
gesture (unlock patterns of smart phones), and another is discrete gesture (keystrokes). When the attacker obtains the CSI
values of gesture privacy, after noise removal, feature extraction, the attacker will decode the gesture successfully.
2500 MHz. 2.4 GHz is divided into 13 frequency bands1[13],
and each frequency band is 22 MHz. However, there are 13
channels in 100 MHz frequency band. That will lead to more
or less overlaps between frequency bands and the overlaps
between frequency band will cause channel interference.
However, when the cental frequency spacing of two frequen-
cy bands is more than 22MHz, there will exist no channel
interference between these two frequency bands. Generally,
channel 1, channel 6 and channel 11 are chosen to be used
simultaneously. Besides channel 1, channel 6 and channel
11, if the devices support, there are other two groups of
channels that doesn’t interfere with each other, and they are
channel 2, channel 7, channel 12; channel 3, channel 8 and
channel 13. For 13 channels, there are 4 channels that are
overlapped with the same channel. Thus, if an AP uses a
ceratin channel, its neighbor AP must use one channel of the
remaining unoverlapped 8 channels, otherwise, there will exist
channel interference between these two neighbor APs.
Furthermore, among the overlapped 4 channels, the channel
interference is different between the two neighbor APs when
the channel spacing between them is different, because the
overlaps between the two channels are different. For example,
the overlaps between channel 2 and channel 1 is 77.27% while
the overlaps between channel 3 and channel 1 is 54.55%. Thus,
the channel interference between channel 2 and channel 1 is
different from that between channel 3 and channel 1.
Prior researches have also demonstrated that adjacent chan-
nel is harmful [14] [15] in 802.11 network, Akella et al.[16]
validate that when there are a plenty of wireless transmitters
in a region, the co-channel interference will greatly reduce the
network output and the output of TCP reduces from 9Mbps to
2Mbps, the output of UDP also reduces and it reduces from
9.7Mbps to 8.6Mbps. In order to keep the neighbor wireless
transmitters non-interfering with each other, there are many
1In this paper, only channel 1 to channel 13 are considered just because the
channel 14 is only used in Japan and only 802.11b can support the channel
14 in Japan.






















Fig. 3: System Overview of WiGuard
channel assignment methods proposed for WLANs [7] [8] [17]
[9].
V. SYSTEM DESIGN
In order to defeat the CSI-based attack, we design a pro-
tection system WiGuard, which uses channel interference to
destroy the QualityCSI , the necessary requirements that the
CSI-based attack can succeed. In this section, we introduce the
system design. First, ICMP based Attacker AP Acquirement
is used to detect whether there exist abnormal ICMP ping
packets, which is caused by CSI values collection by an
attacker. Then, if there is no abnormal ICMP ping packets, the
user can do their gestures; if there exist abnormal ICMP ping
packets, the user should detect which channel the target public















(b) attacker collects CSI values
Fig. 4: Public WiFi packets analysis using wireshark. When
the attacker collect gesture CSI values, there will exist plenty
of ICMP packets in different time.
transmitter to a proper channel to interfere the attacker, as
shown in Figure 3.
A. ICMP based Attacker AP Acquirement
In order to successfully decode the users’ gesture privacy in-
formation, the attacker should have a fine-grained CSI values.
Coarse-grained CSI values can’t characterize the difference
between gestures, especially for those micro motions, such
as digital unlock passwords of smart phones, keystrokes of
laptops. However, CSI values are measured on ICMP ping
packets. Thus, in order to obtain fine-grained CSI values, the
attacker’s receiver needs to continuously ping packets from
public AP at a high rate, such as the rate of ICMP ping packets
should be 2500 packets/s [2], in order to decode the keystrokes
of laptops successfully.
In normal cases, ICMP ping packets occur to test the
network connectivity and ICMP ping packets are sent at the
rate of one packet per second [18]. So, generally, there exist
no ICMP ping packets or few ICMP ping packets for public
AP, as shown in Figure 4a. When an attacker leverages the
public AP to collect CSI values, the attacker’s receiver will
continuously ping packets from public AP at a high rate, and
there will exist plenty of ICMP ping packets in the network,
as shown in Figure 4b.
Thus, whether there exist ICMP ping packets and the
number of ICMP ping packets per unit of time can be used to
detect whether the public AP is leveraged by the attacker to
collect CSI values. If a public AP is detected to exist plenty
of ICMP ping packets during different time periods, then it is
very likely caused by an attacker who is pinging the public
AP at a high rate, and we think there exist an attack in the
public place.
However, sometimes, there will not exist only one public
AP in the public place, and the attacker may use two or more
public APs to improve the success rate of CSI-based attack,
Abdelnasser et al.[19] demonstrate that the recovery accuracy
will be improved using multiple APs. So, in public place, the
attacker can use more public APs instead of just only public
AP to decode the gesture privacy successfully. Thus, in order
to make sure that the attacker does not leverage all potential
public APs to collect CSI values, the user need to surf all the
public APs to detect how many public APs are used by the
attacker.
B. Decision Making
After detecting the number of public APs that may be used
by the attacker, the user can make a decision whether it is safe
in the public place to do gesture privacy. When the network
is normal, and is without suspicious CSI values’ collection,
the user can do his/her gesture privacy immediately. However,
when the network activity is abnormal with suspicious CSI
values’ collection, the user will need to adopt the channel
interference protection system before doing his/her gesture
privacy.
The channel interference protection system is mainly di-
vided into two parts, and the first part is detecting which
channel the target public AP works on, and then the channel
of a safe wireless transmitter will be switched to a proper
adjacent channel to interfere the attacker. The following two
subsections will introduction the details.
C. Channel Detection
When the user detect that there exist abnormal ICMP ping
packets in the network, first, the system will detect which
channel the target public APs work on. The channel detection
is easily achieved, and there are also many commercial ap-
plications that can support the channel detection functionality,
such as WiFi Analyzer.
D. Adjacent Channel Interference
After detecting the channel that the target public APs work
on, adjacent channel interference will be used to protect
the user’s gesture privacy. However, how should the channel
of a safe wireless transmitter change when the number of
target public APs is different? Which channel should the safe
wireless transmitter switch so that the packet loss rate caused
by channel interference is the maximum? Then we will give
details of adjacent channel interference protection method.
1) Safe Wireless Transmitter:
In order to interfere the channel of the target public APs,
the channel of a safe wireless transmitter need to be switched.
The safe wireless transmitter can be the normal public APs in
the public place. The user can also use his/her devices with
hotspot functionality as the safe wireless transmitters, such
as his/her smartphones or laptops. When the public wireless
network is detected to be abnormal, the hotspot functionality
of the user’s devices can be turned on, and then the channel
of users’ devices will be switched to interfere the attacker.
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2) Channel Switch:
After detecting the channels, a safe wireless transmitter will
switch its channel to interfere the attacker. However, there are
four adjacent channels that can interfere the same channel,
from the above analysis in section IV, we know that when the
channel spacing between two neighbor APs is different, the
channel interference between them is also different, thus the
packet loss rate that caused by the channel interference will
also be different, so which channel should the safe wireless
transmitter switch to interfere the attacker so that the packet
rate loss will be the maximum?
Theoretically, when the channel spacing between two neigh-
bor APs is 1, the channel interference between them is the
maximum because the overlaps between the two channels is
the maximum. Thus, the safe wireless transmitter can switch to
an adjacent channel to interfere the attacker, which the channel
spacing between the safe wireless transmitter and the target
public AP is 1.
However, the attacker may use two or more public APs
to collect CSI values in order to improve the success rate, so
how the channel of safe wireless transmitter switch to interfere
all the target public APs? There are two kinds of conditions,
and one is that the safe wireless transmitter only just need to
switch to a proper channel, another is that the safe wireless
transmitter need to switch between two channels to interfere
all the target public APs to prevent the attacker from obtaining
CSI values.
(a) Switch to a proper channel
There are two different cases that the attacker’s received
CSI signals will lose the packets when the channel of the
safe wireless transmitter is switched to a proper channel.
In the first case, there is only one target public AP in the
public place, the safe wireless transmitter can switch the
channel to adjacent channel, for example, when the target
public AP works on channel 6, then the user can switch
the channel of a safe wireless transmitter to channel 5 or
channel 7. In another case, there are two or more target
public APs in the public place, and channel spacing of all
the target public APs is smaller than 5, then the channel of
the safe wireless transmitter can switch to a proper channel
to interfere the attacker, for example, the channels of two
target public APs are separately channel 1 and channel 6,
then the safe wireless transmitter can switch to channel 3
or channel 4.
Although in the second case, the safe wireless transmitter
can switched to a proper channel to interfere the attacker,
however, in order to make the packet loss rate be max-
imum, the safe wireless transmitter can switch between
two channels.
(b) Switch between two channels
If the channel spacing between the target public APs are
larger than 5, then the safe wireless transmitter should
switch between two channels. For example, there are two
public APs detected to exist abnormal network activity,
and the channel of the two target public APs are sepa-
rately channel 1 and channel 11, then the safe wireless
transmitter need to be switched between channel 2 and
channel 10.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement WiGuard on current TP-Link wireless routers
in a room in indoor environment.
A. Experiments setup
TP-Link wireless routers and smart devices with wireless
hotspot functionality are separately as the wireless transmit-
ters, and the receiver is a desktop equipped with Intel 5300
NIC(Network Interface Controller). The transmitter operates in
IEEE 802.11n. The receiver has 3 antennas and the firmware
reports CSI to upper layers. The receiver continuously pings
packets and the receiver stores and processes the collected
packets. The collected packets are a sequence of data and each
packet contains the RSSI values of three antennas, the value
of noise, CSI, and so on. Each CSI represents the phases and
amplitudes that are on a group of 30 OFDM subcarriers.
B. Parameters for interference evaluation
After detecting the channel of public APs the target public
AP, then the safe wireless transmitter will switch to a proper
channel to interfere the target public APs. However, there are
several adjacent channels that can interfere the public APs,
which channel should the safe wireless transmitter switch
to make the channel interference between the safe wireless
transmitter and the target public APs maximum so that the
packet loss rate can achieve maximum. In this paper, we
introduce four parameters to quantify the channel interference
between safe wireless transmitter and the target public APs,
and one is the number of the received packets, one is packet
loss rate, one is interference strength [20], and the last is active
ratio [20]. We define the four parameters as follows:
• The number of the received packets.
What we have obtained at the receiver is a sequence of
CSI values, and the length of the sequence is the number
of the received packets.
• Packet loss rate.
Packet Loss Rate =
RV of RP − IV of RP
RV of RP
(1)
In the above equation, RV of RP represents the refer-
ence number of received packets, which the packets are
obtained when the safe wireless transmitter and target
public APs work on different channels and there exist
no channel interference between them2. IV of RP
represents the interference number of received packets,
which the packets are obtained when the safe wireless
transmitter and the target public APs work on adjacent
channels and there will exist adjacent channel interfer-
ence between them.
2We assume that when the safe wireless transmitter and the public APs that
the attacker leverages work on different channels and there exist no channel









In the above equation, RSSIi noise removal represents
the RSSI value of i− th packets that has been removed
noise, and RP represents the reference number of the
received packets. The value of IS represents the inter-
ference strength between the safe wireless transmitter
and the target public AP, the value of IS is greater, the
interference strength between the safe wireless transmitter








if |RSSIi+Noisei|RSSIi noise removal ≥ 1, Ui = 1
other, Ui = 0
(3)
In the above equation, RSSIi represents the RSSI value
of i−th packets and Noisei represents the noise value of
i− th packets, the value of AR is greater, the noise that
contains in the received packets is lower, and the channel
interference between the safe wireless transmitter and the
target public APs will be weaker.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, first we demonstrate that the channel inter-
ference between two neighbor wireless transmitters is different
when the channel spacing between them is different, and that
lays a foundation for channel switch, then we demonstrate that
when the distance of two wireless transmitters is longer than
Dneighbor, there will not exist channel interference between
them, finally we reappear the experiments of WiPass [3] and
WiKey [2], and demonstrate that the channel interference can
defeat CSI-based attack.
A. Channel Interference on Public APs that Attacker Lever-
ages
In order to choose a proper channel to interfere the target
public APs, first the experiments of different channel spacing
between two wireless transmitters are done. For some public
APs, they may adopt simple co-channel interference avoidance
algorithm, in order to demonstrate that the channel interference
can last enough time so that the gesture privacy can be done,
then the experiemnts of the last time of channel interference
are done.
1) Channel:
For public APs that can work in the same public place,
in order to avoid channel interference between them, they
always work on channel 1, channel 6 and channel 11. Thus,
there are six conditions of the channels for two neighbor
wireless transmitters, and in this part, the experiments of
these six conditions are done to demonstrate that when the
channel spacing between two neighbor wireless transmitters is
different, the channel interference between them will also be
different. In these experiments, the distance between the two
neighbor APs is 1m and the results are as shown in Figure 5.
In Figure 5 the value “0” in X-axis means that there exists
no channel interference between two wireless transmitters, the
value “−2” and “2” means that the channel spacing between
two wireless transmitters is 2 ; the value “−1” and “1” means
the channel spacing between two wireless transmitters is 1.
“−” means that the channel of the target public AP is smaller
than the channel of the safe wireless transmitter.
We can see from Figure 5 that the number of received pack-
ets is the maximum when there exists no channel interference
between the two neighbor wireless transmitters. The number
of received packets is relatively low when there exists channel
interference between the two wireless transmitters, and when
the channel spacing between two wireless transmitters is 1, the
number of received packets is the minimum and the packet
loss rate is the maximum. For example, in Figure 5a and
Figure 5b, when the channel of safe wireless transmitter is
1, the channel of the target public AP is 6, if the safe wireless
transmitter switches to channel 5, the number of received
packets is 319 and the packet loss rate is 37.695%; if the
safe wireless transmitter switches to channel 7, the number of
received packets is 277 and the packet loss rate is 45.894%;
while if the safe wireless transmitter switches to channel 4,
the number of received packets is 423 and the packet loss
rate is 17.383%; and if the safe wireless transmitter switches
to channel 8, the number of received packets is 382 and the
packet loss rate is 25.392%. Thus, when the channel spacing
between the safe wireless transmitter and the target public AP
is 1, the channel interference between them can achieve the
maximum.
We can see from Figure 5c and Figure 5d that when
there exists no channel interference between safe wireless
transmitter and the target public AP, the value of interference
strength is the minimum and the value of active ratio is the
maximum. When the safe wireless transmitter switches the
channel, the value of interference strength will increase and the
value of the active ratio will decrease. When channel spacing
between the safe wireless transmitter and the target public AP
is 1, the value of the interference strength is the maximum and
the value of active ratio is the minimum. That is consistent
with the analysis in section VI-B.
Thus, when the channel spacing between the safe wireless
transmitter and the target public AP is 1, the channel interfer-
ence between them achieve the maximum. So, the user can
switch the safe wireless transmitter to adjacent channel to
interfere attacker, and the channel spacing between the safe
wireless transmitter and the target public AP is 1.
2) Time:
For some wireless transmitters, they may adopt simple co-
channel interference avoidance algorithm, and when the APs
detect channel interference, they will choose another proper
cannel to transmit data [21]. In order to demonstrate how long





















































































































































Fig. 5: Four parameters to characterize the channel interference under six conditions for the safe wireless transmitter and the
public AP that the attacker leverages
transmitter and the target public AP after switching the channel
of safe wireless transmitter so that the users’ gesture privacy
can be completely done during the interference time, we
collected 90s data after switching the channel of the safe
wireless transmitter.
We can see from Figure 6a that the number of received
packets for the fourth 10s is the maximum under the six
conditions, in Figure 6b, the difference for the value of IS and
AR between different periods is small. So with the increase
of time, the channel interference between the safe wireless
transmitter and the target public AP will weaken, however,
there still exists channel interference between the safe wireless
transmitter and the target public AP after 90s, 90s is enough to
do some gesture privacy. If the user does the gesture privacy
for a long time, the user can detect the channel of the target
public AP, and if the channel of target public AP switches
to another channel during the time when gesture privacy is
done, then the safe wireless transmitter switches its channel
accordingly.
B. Channel Interference on Normal Public Wireless Transmit-
ters
When the safe wireless transmitter is far away from the
normal public APs, there will not exist channel interference
between them. In order to choose a proper distance between
the safe wireless transmitter and the other normal public
APs, the experiments of different distances are done and the
experiments are done when the channel spacing between the
safe wireless transmitter and the other normal public AP is 1.
We can see from Figure 7a that when the distance between
the safe wireless transmitter and the other normal pubic AP
is from 0.5m to 2m, the reference value of received packets
and the interference value of received packets are almost the
same, that just because when the safe wireless transmitter and
the attacker’s wireless transmitter are near enough, even when
there exist no channel interference between them, it will also
influence the number of the received packets. With the increase
of distance between them, the influence of channel interference
will weaken and the number of received packets will increase.
We can see from Figure 7a that when the distance between safe
wireless transmitter and the other normal public AP is more
than 3m, the channel interference between them will become
weak.
In Figure 7b, when the distance is less than 2m, IS is high
and AR is relatively low, when the distance is more than 3m,
IS decreases and AR increases dramatically. So in order not
to interfere the other normal public APs, the distance between
the safe wireless transmitter and the other normal public APs
would be better when it is more than 4m.
C. Case Study
There are two kinds of gestures for CSI-based attack, and
we separately choose unlock patterns and keystrokes as the
representative gestures for consecutive gestures and discrete
gestures to do the experiments, and the results are as shown
in Figure 8. Uellenbeck et al.[22] found that there exist typical
7
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 the fourth 10s
 the first 60s
(a) The number of received packets and packet loss rate











RIS for the first 60s
AR for the first 60s
IS for the second 10s
AR for the second 10s
IS for the third 10s
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IS for the fourth 10s
AR for the fourth 10s
(b) The interference strength and active radio
Fig. 6: Four parameters to characterize the duration of channel interference under the six conditions for the safe wireless
transmitter and the other normal public APs




































(a) The number of received packets and packet loss rate
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Reference value of AR
Interference value of IS
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(b) Interference strength and active ratio
Fig. 7: Four parameters under different distances














no channel interference exist channel interference
(a) Unlock passwords recognition














no channel interference exist channel interference
(b) Keyboards recognition
Fig. 9: Users’ behavior recognition when there exists no channel interference and channel interference
strategies for frequently used unlock patterns, such as the top
left corner is usually used as a starting point and straight lines
are more popular in their patterns. According to it, 15 unlock
passwords are randomly chosen as the tested unlock passwords
according to the habits of people’s daily use, and the tested
15 unlock passwords are shown in Figure 8. Besides, numpad
0 to numpad 9 in the right of the keyboard are chosen as the
tested keystrokes.
The recovery results of the two case studies are shown in
Figure 9. We can see from Figure 9a that when there exists no
channel interference, the recovery accuracy is relatively high,
and the average recovery accuracy of 15 unlock password
patterns is 82.33%, and the average recovery accuracy of
10 keypads is 92%, as shown in Figure 9b. The results
of unlock patterns and keyboard recovery demonstrate that
wireless signals can leak the users’ privacy and it should be a
warning for users.
We can see from Figure 9 that when there exists channel
interference, the recovery accuracy is relatively low, and the
average recovery accuracy of 15 unlock password patterns
is 21.67%, the average recovery accuracy of 10 keypads is
42%. Comparing to the recovery accuracy when there exists
8
pattern 1 pattern 2 pattern 3 pattern 4 pattern 5
pattern 6 pattern 7 pattern 8 pattern 9 pattern 10
pattern 11 pattern 12 pattern 13 pattern 14 pattern 15
Fig. 8: 15 tested unlock passwords for Android unlock patterns


























no adjacent channel interference
adjacnet channel interference
Fig. 10: Evaluation on good AP
no channel interference, the recovery accuracy when there
exists channel interference decreases dramatically. The results
demonstrate that channel interference can defeat CSI-based
attacker effectively.
D. Channel Interference on the Network Service
If the target public AP is interfered, the network service for
normal users who have accessed it will also be interfered.
Watching a online show is chosen to test the influence of
channel interference on network service. We can see from
Figure 10 that when a user is watching a online show using the
target public AP, after the safe wireless transmitter switches the
channel, the network service can also be good and the video
is also smooth. Thus, the influence of channel interference on
network service is small and the user can also have a normal
network service.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The prior researches paid their attention on two kinds of
channel interferences and one is interference between different
communication systems and another is channel interference
between 802.11 communication system.
A. Interference between 802.11 networks and other networks
that works on 2.4GHz
ISM (Industrial Scientific Medical) 2.4 GHz is an open
frequency band worldwide and many communication systems
work on it, such as ZigBee, WiFi, Bluetooth and wireless USB.
With the development of short-range wireless communication
systems in recent years, more and more systems work on
2.4GHz. However, the frequency band of 2.4GHz is limit-
ed, and that will lead to the interference between different
communication systems. The interference problem will be
increasingly serious and inevitable with an increasing number
of short-range wireless communication systems.
According to [5], previous researches have been classified
into the following three categories:
• Interference mechanism/Interference principle.
The researches that paid their attention on interference
mechanism/interference principle try to analyze the rea-
son why the interference can appear between different
communication systems, such as, Yuan et al.[23] divided
the interferences between WiFi and ZigBee into four
cases, and analyze whether there exist channel interfer-
ence in the four cases. The researches on interference
mechinism/interference principle will lay a foundation for
the following two categories of researches.
• Interference avoidance.
The essence of interference avoidance is spectrum re-
source scheduling problem, and the core problem is how
to allocate the spectrum resource to transmit the data in
different communication systems. Tytgat et al.[24] and
Shi et al.[25] achieve interference avoidance between
WiFi and ZigBee communication systems. Lee et al.[26]
propose collaborative approach and non-collaborative ap-
proach to solve the interference avoidance.
• Interference coexistence.
When spectrum resource is occupied completely, the
interference is inevitable, and how to make different
communication coexist with the interference is a chal-
lenge. The research [27] achieve interference coexistence
between WiFi and ZigBee, Almeida et al.[28] achieve
interference coexistence between WiFi and LTE.
B. Channel Interference in 802.11 networks
Villegas et al.[6] propose that there are two types of interfer-
ence in 802.11 networks, and one is co-channel interference,
which is caused by the transmissions that are carried out on
the same frequency channel; and another is adjacent chan-
nel interference, which is caused by the transmissions that
are carried out on adjacent channels or partially overlapped
channels. Zubow et al.[15] analyze the adverse effects of
adjacent channel interference in 802.11 networks. Tan et
al.[29] evaluate the effects of adjacent channel interference
through extensive experiments. Previous researches on channel
interference in 802.11 networks mainly paid their attention on
how to allocate the channels for those WiFi nodes to avoid
co-channel interference, how to justify the adjacent channel
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interference to assist different management mechanisms radio
resource. Different from prior work, which thinks channel
interference as detrimental, however, in this paper, channel
interference is exploited to defeat CSI-based attack.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper presents WiGuard, a novel method that can
defeat CSI-based attack, which exploits public WiFi to obtain
the users’ gesture privacy. The intuition underlying our design
is that if we can interfere the attacker’s wireless transmitter
to distort the CSI signal, then the attacker will not recover
the gesture privacy successfully. In order to distort the CSI
signal, WiGuard exploits the potential of channel interference
to defeat the attack. WiGuard first detects the channel of the
target public AP using the number of ICMP ping packets
because in order to obtain the fine-grained CSI values to
recover gesture privacy, the attacker need to ping the target
public AP at a high rate. After detecting the channel, the user
can switch a safe wireless transmitter to a proper channel
to interfere the attacker. Extensive experiments demonstrate
that when the channel spacing of safe wireless transmitter
the target public AP is 1, the channel interference between
them can achieve maximum, and the user can switch the
safe wireless transmitter to that channel. When the distance
between the safe wireless transmitter and the other normal
public APs is more than 4m, channel interference between
them becomes weak, and Dneighbor can be set as 4m, so
when the distance between them is more than 4m, the channel
switch of the safe wireless transmitter will not influence
the other normal public APs. Evaluation on network service
demonstrate that channel interference will not influence the
normal network service. Unlock passwords and keyboards
recovery experiments show that when there exists channel
interference, the recovery accuracy decrease dramatically, thus,
our system WiGuard is effective and channel interference can
be used to defeat CSI-based attack.
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